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To an industry lobbyist, therole of government is to adoptprograms and regulations that
increase profits for the firms in the
industry. Steel and timber lobbyists
argue for higher taxes on imports;
lobbyists for power generators argue
for lower air quality standards; and
farm lobbyists argue for higher sup-
port prices and stronger protection
from imports. When government re-
sponds to lobbying pressure and
adopts a new program or regulation,
all firms in the industry typically
have access to the benefits. And be-
cause the benefits often are in pro-
portion to the level of production, the
largest firms obtain the greatest ben-
efit. Thus, President Bush’s import
taxes on steel benefit the largest steel
companies the most. In agriculture,
the best example of this principle is
the sugar program. The program lim-
its U.S. imports of sugar, thus costing
U.S. consumers approximately $1.4
billion per year through higher
prices. According to a recent Heritage
Foundation study, Alfonso and Jose
Fanjul, owners of Flo-Sun, Inc., in
Palm Beach, Florida, benefit by ap-
proximately $65 million per year from
producing sugar in Central Florida.
Furthermore, they obtain an addi-
tional $60 million per year because
they are given a portion of the U.S.
import quota, which allows them to
import inexpensive Dominican sugar
into the high-priced U.S. market.
That the benefits from govern-
ment intervention in agricultural
markets accrue to the largest farms
troubles many who otherwise sup-
port farm subsidies as a means of
ensuring adequate incomes for farm
families. Making sure that farm fami-
lies were not financially destitute
was arguably the original purpose of
farm programs in the 1930s. A large
proportion of the U.S. population
lived on farms and in rural areas, so
program benefits flowed much more
widely and uniformly than they do
now. But as concentration of farm-
land ownership increased over time,
so too did concern over the concen-
tration of farm program benefits.
Congress recognized this concern in
the 1970 farm bill by placing limits
on farm program payments.
The payment limitations issue
was one of the most divisive debates
of the 2002 farm bill. Computers, the
Internet, and the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act allowed the Environmental
Working Group to create a web site
that revealed that most payments
went to relatively few farmers. The
resulting publicity put supporters of
farm programs on the defensive and
gave some impetus to those who ar-
gued for an overhaul of payments. The
debate highlighted strong regional dif-
ferences on the issue. Senators and
representatives from the Midwest gen-
erally supported some tightening of
limits. Those from the South generally
opposed any new restrictions because
southern crops receive relatively high
per-acre payments.
Congress passed the new farm
bill with few meaningful changes in
payment limits. But one outcome of
the debate was the appointment of a
USDA commission to study the im-
pact of payment limitations on agri-
cultural producers and related
entities. The commission report is
expected in May or June. An exami-
nation of the economics and politics
of payment limits will give some per-
spective to the outcome of the com-
mission report. A brief review of the
recent history of payment limits is a
useful place to start.
CURRENT PAYMENT LIMITATIONS
AND THEIR EFFECTS
The 1996 farm bill limited Produc-
tion Flexibility Contract payments
(commonly known as AMTA or
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“Freedom to Farm” payments), loan
deficiency payments, and marketing
loan gains. The limits were set for a
“person,” with a person being de-
fined as an individual, limited liabil-
ity partnership or company,
corporation, or association that has
a distinct and separate interest in
the land or commodity and main-
tains separate responsibilities, ac-
counts, and funds from others
involved in the operation. For a
more detailed description of pay-
ment eligibility requirements and
limitations, see the Farm Service
Agency fact sheet at http://www.
fsa.usda.gov/pas/publications/facts/
payelig01.pdf.
Payment limits were set at
$40,000 per person for AMTA pay-
ments and $75,000 per person for
the sum of loan deficiency payments
and marketing loan gains. Persons
had to be actively engaged in farm-
ing to be eligible. A husband and
wife were considered as one person
unless they requested to be consid-
ered as separate persons and met
the exception requirements. Persons
were limited to receiving payments
on three entities. On the second and
third entities, persons were limited
to a 50 percent ownership share or
less. This means that participants
could have received up to $80,000 in
AMTA payments and $150,000 in
marketing loan benefits per year. In
addition, Congress allowed unlim-
ited use of commodity certificates or
forfeiture settlements of marketing
loans so that the $150,000 limit
could be circumvented.
The seriousness with which Con-
gress viewed these payment limits is
open to question, because once they
started to actually bind, they were
loosened. During the downturn in
crop prices in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, Congress authorized
temporary changes to the payment
limitation guidelines. The limit on
marketing loan benefits was raised
to $150,000 per person for the 1999,
2000, and 2001 crop years. In combi-
nation with the three-entity rule, this
meant that participants could re-
ceive up to $300,000 in marketing
loan benefits. The limits on AMTA
payments were not changed because
AMTA payments were fixed. The ad-
ditional marketing loss assistance
payments made in these years were
not subject to AMTA limits.
The 2002 farm bill authorizes a
new countercyclical price program
and allows updating of program
bases for farm programs. Congress
adjusted the structure of payment
limitations to account for these
changes. The combined limit on loan
deficiency payments and marketing
loan gains has been returned to
$75,000 per person. Direct payments
are limited to $40,000 per person.
Countercyclical payments are limited
to $65,000 per person. The three-
entity rule remains in effect, allowing
participants to receive up to $360,000
per year from these programs. Again,
the use of commodity certificates or
forfeiture settlement of marketing
loans does not count against market-
ing loan benefit limitations.
Senator Charles Grassley intro-
duced a bill in March 2003 that would
cap direct payments at $20,000,
countercyclical payments at $30,000,
and the combination of loan defi-
ciency payments, marketing loan
gains, commodity certificates, and
forfeiture of loans at $87,500 per per-
son per year. With the three-entity
rule, total benefits would be con-
strained to $275,000 per year. If
passed, this bill—Senate Bill 667—
would greatly increase the number of
farmers affected by payment limits.
For example, for the current crop
year, only cotton, rice, and peanut
prices are low enough to trigger
countercyclical payments.
Countercyclical payments are pro-
jected to be 13.7¢ per pound for cot-
ton and $1.66 per hundredweight for
rice. Given payment yields of 605
pounds for cotton and 48.15 hundred-
weight for rice (their national aver-
ages under the 1996 farm bill),
program participants with 923 base
acres in cotton or 957 base acres in
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rice would hit the countercyclical
limit. According to the 1997 Census of
Agriculture, 10 percent of cotton
farms and 4.5 percent of rice farms
had over 1,000 acres. Under the
Grassley proposal, 426 acres of cot-
ton and 442 acres of rice would hit
the limit. Census data shows that 28.8
percent of cotton farms and 19.9 per-
cent of rice farms exceeded 500
acres. In addition, cotton and rice
producers are the main users of com-
modity certificates. Their inclusion in
the payment limitation for marketing
loans would have a large impact on
these crops. This might explain why
senators and representatives from
the South and California are so op-
posed to payment limits in general,
and to Senate Bill 667 in particular.
DO FARM PROGRAMS INCREASE
CONCENTRATION?
Advocates of stricter payment limits
typically argue that making large
payments to wealthy farmers simply
is not fair and that adding to the
wealth of large farmers enhances
their ability to get even bigger. The
fairness of the issue is a political
judgment but we can say something
about the conditions in which pay-
ment limits increase concentration
in agriculture.
The ability to expand a farm op-
eration depends on obtaining financ-
ing, which in turn depends on the
prospective returns from the expan-
sion and the current financial condi-
tion of the farm. If two farmers are
interested in a tract of land and they
have identical cost structures and
management abilities, then prospec-
tive returns from investing in the
tract of land will be identical, which
suggests that each farmer’s willing-
ness to pay for the land is identical.
But the ability to pay for the land
may depend on credit availability. A
lower cost of capital will give an ad-
vantage. In general, the cost of capital
will depend on the riskiness of the
venture. If one of the farm operations
is much larger than the other, then
the additional riskiness from expan-
sion, expressed as a percentage of
current cash flow or net worth, will
be much less. Thus, the cost of capi-
tal will be lower for the larger farmer.
And, of course, enhancements of
cash flow from government payments
will only increase this advantage. In
this sense, farm programs can in-
crease land ownership concentration.
Of course, there are other rea-
sons why large farmers may have an
advantage in bidding for land. In-
creases in farm size often decrease
per-acre costs. These economies of
scale of the large farms can translate
into greater willingness to pay for
land. Advocates of payment limits
argue that large farms should not be
able to use government subsidies to
help finance expansion. Rather, mar-
ket returns should dictate any ex-
pansion or contraction. Strict
payment limits would reduce the
willingness to pay for land if a farm
is already above the limit, thus giv-
ing an advantage to smaller farmers
in competition for land. Adoption of
lower payment caps would not nec-
essarily result in a dramatic reduc-
tion in the price of land if there were
many farmers below the payment
cap. But the extra advantage that
large farmers have in bidding on
land would disappear.
ARE PAYMENT LIMITS CONSISTENT
WITH FARM POLICY OBJECTIVES?
Most advocates of stricter payment
limits argue that farm programs
should be designed to maintain and
strengthen the financial condition of
farm families that own and/or oper-
ate small- to moderate-sized farms,
as was their original intention in the
1930s. Supporting the wealth of large
farmers does not seem consistent
with this objective. Judging Con-
gress by its actions rather than its
rhetoric, we must conclude that the
objective of the farm program has
changed. After all, Congress makes
payments when prices are low with-
out regard to production costs,
makes disaster payments when
yields are low without regard to
prices received, and makes no ac-
count of the actual financial condi-
tions of farm families before cutting
checks. That is, there is little target-
ing of payments and absolutely no
means tests. Moreover, it is well
documented that average farm fam-
ily income meets or exceeds non-
farm family income. So, without a
means test, most farm support flows
to families that have higher-than-
average incomes.
We cannot conclude, however,
that maintaining farm income is not
the objective of farm programs. As
Senator Lugar of Indiana argues, the
farm policy actions of Congress over
the last 10 to 20 years are consistent
with a policy objective of maintain-
ing national net farm income at a
particular level. Given that so few
commodities receive subsidies, per-
haps it is more accurate to say that
Congress wants to support the farm
income generated by a chosen few
commodities.
Maintaining national or aggre-
gate farm income is analogous to an
industrial policy objective, because
what matters is aggregate income in
the industry. Any payment to any
participant in the industry helps ful-
fill the objective. Maintenance of
family income, on the other hand,
requires an income means test,
much like we have with food stamps
and other social welfare programs. A
recent USDA study showed that farm
family income could be supported at
a far lower cost than that of the cur-
rent commodity programs.
Even if Congress were to decide
to target program benefits to farm
families in financial difficulty, it is
not clear that this would be best ac-
complished through stricter pay-
ment limits. The most direct tool for
achieving this policy objective is the
tax code. For example, a government
payment could be made to farm
families that do not meet a certain
income threshold.
What then can be said about ar-
guments for and against payment
continued on page 10
4        CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT    SPRING 2003
Iowa Ag Review
Overcoming Information Barriers in Cattle Marketing
Brent Hueth, guest contributor
bhueth@iastate.edu
John Lawrence, guest contributor
jdlaw@iastate.edu
Editor’s Note: This article is adapted
from a CARD briefing paper, “Qual-
ity Management and Information
Transmission in Cattle Markets: A
Case Study of the Chariton Valley
Beef Alliance.” The full text of the
briefing paper is available at
www.card.iastate.edu.
Beef consumption has de-clined steadily over the lasttwo decades, both in total
quantity and as a share of U.S.
meat consumption. Reductions in
the price of pork and poultry and
health concerns about the effects
of red meat consumption account
for much of this trend. However,
relative improvements in the qual-
ity and consistency of pork and
poultry products may also be a
factor. Perhaps it is no coinci-
dence that the beef industry has
trailed pork and poultry in adopt-
ing methods for vertical coordina-
tion among the various production
stages from farm to market. Con-
tract arrangements and vertical
linkages—alliances among produc-
ers, processors, and retailers—are
common in pork and poultry pro-
duction. Beef production, on the
other hand, mainly is still coordi-
nated through traditional market
structures.
Whether vertical coordination
of the kind observed in pork and
poultry markets is necessary for
further improvement in beef qual-
ity is a question that beef industry
participants currently are trying to
sort out. The beef industry has
adopted a variety of novel market-
ing practices in recent years to im-
prove quality and reduce overall
production costs. At one extreme
are recent attempts to fully inte-
grate the beef production process,
with a single firm coordinating ge-
netic selection, feeding practices,
slaughter and fabrication, and mar-
keting. Long-term marketing arrange-
ments between feedlots and packers
represent a somewhat less extreme
form of integration and have been
used in some production areas for
many years. Interestingly, the most
widely adopted change in recent
years—so-called grid pricing—repre-
sents an attempt to improve market
coordination through more sophisti-
cated quality-based pricing mecha-
nisms. In this case, and in contrast
with direct vertical integration, there
are essentially no formal vertical
linkages; instead, the process at-
tempts to improve vertical coordina-
tion through the communication of
precise signals about the relative
value of various carcass attributes.
Behind all these efforts is at least
one common objective: to align in-
centives so that quality improvement
is in everyone’s best interest. It
seems that many of the traditional
methods for marketing live cattle
(both feeder and finished cattle) are
not designed with this objective in
mind. In particular, in traditional
marketing, the flow of production-
relevant information across the vari-
ous stages of beef production is sig-
nificantly restricted.
CATTLE MARKETS AND INFORMATION
TRANSMISSION
The production process for beef
cattle is typically characterized in
terms of a number of distinct stages
starting with genetic selection and
breeding, then rearing and weaning,
and finally fattening to market
weight (“finishing”) and slaughter.
Specialization in cattle markets to
some extent mirrors each of these
stages: seedstock firms control ge-
netic selection and breed develop-
ment; ranchers manage cow and calf
herds and raise young calves
through the weaning stage; feeders
raise animals from weaning to mar-
ket weight; and packers slaughter
and process live animals. Although
there are many variations on this
structure of specialization, for the
moment we will focus on this par-
ticular arrangement.
We can characterize efficient de-
cision making at each production
stage, subject to a given set of grow-
ing conditions, breed types, feed
costs, other market parameters, and
other pieces of production-relevant
information. For instance, a feeder’s
nutrition and health maintenance
program for a given animal (or lot of
animals) might conceivably depend
on nutrition and treatment histories
during the rearing and weaning pro-
duction stages, thus creating the
need for information transmission
from ranchers to feeders. It may also
be important to transmit informa-
tion in the reverse direction, from
feeders to ranchers. For example,
ranchers need information on feed-
ers’ management procedures, finish-
ing performance, and post-slaughter
carcass quality in order to evaluate
past decision making.
While sharing this kind of infor-
mation may seem like an obvious
requirement for efficient decision
making in beef production, in fact it
rarely occurs. Tracking, recording,
and transmitting information is
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costly. If the costs are high enough,
the transacting parties may choose
to either forgo information transmis-
sion entirely or may seek some sub-
stitute information that is not quite
as detailed but is less costly to ob-
tain. In the context of markets for
feeder calves, many feedlots employ
order buyers to visually inspect
calves for traits that are appropriate
to the particular operation. How-
ever, any such visual inspection, no
matter how experienced the buyer,
is an imperfect substitute for perfect
transmission of all production-
relevant information. Specifically,
vaccination, nutrition, and treat-
ments histories cannot be observed.
Feedlots assume a worst-case sce-
nario, often expecting the need to
readminister treatments, and they
therefore reduce bid offers. Similar
problems arise in the transmission
of information from packers to feed-
ers and ranchers.
THE CHARITON VALLEY
BEEF ALLIANCE
The Chariton Valley Beef Alliance
(CVBA) is a group of 350 southern
Iowa cattle producers who are at-
tempting to overcome these prob-
lems. The CVBA has been in place
since early 1998. The alliance arose
because area packers increasingly
used grid-pricing arrangements and
the producers wanted to learn to
produce, sort, and market cattle
more effectively under these ar-
rangements. Carcass data collection
and source verification are two of
the alliance’s primary activities.
CARCASS DATA COLLECTION
Grid marketing involves the pricing
of individual animals (rather than
lots of animals) based on the mea-
surement of various carcass-quality
attributes. Yet, animal-specific car-
cass measurements are rarely trans-
mitted back to the feeders and
cow-calf producers who deliver un-
der these arrangements. Perhaps the
most important activity of the CVBA
is to facilitate and coordinate this
transmission. Producers interested
in obtaining carcass data pay a ser-
vice fee to the CVBA ($3–$8 per
head). The CVBA then coordinates
with a third party to physically carry
out carcass measurement during
slaughter, recording them in elec-
tronic form for access by the rel-
evant producer. Packers cooperate
in this process by allowing third-
party access to the slaughter floor
for traits measurement (beyond
those reported in USDA yield and
quality grades). The CVBA addition-
ally provides support for accessing
and interpreting the relevant data.
This analysis allows growers to
make better marketing, nutrition,
and genetic decisions.
While it might seem a small mat-
ter to distribute animal-specific
carcass-quality data to producers
(given that prices are based on this
data), in fact it is quite complicated
and costly. As we noted, doing so
adds $3 to $8 dollars per head to the
cost of production. Iowa State Uni-
versity Extension estimates a gross
margin of roughly $15 per head for
Iowa feedlots.
SOURCE VERIFICATION
Assessing quality in markets for
feeder cattle is a notoriously difficult
task. USDA quality grades do exist
for feeder cattle, but they are rarely
used. Instead, most quality assess-
ment is accomplished through visual
inspection by experienced buyers.
Of course, many of the important
quality characteristics of feeder
calves are not fully expressed until
the calves have been fattened and
readied for slaughter. One means of
making this process more objective
is to provide third-party verification
of genetic and health characteristics
of feeder cattle. In addition to pro-
viding an objective measure of qual-
ity, source verification provides
feedlots with accurate information
on the status of medical treatments
that have occurred before the point
of sale and on the genetic composi-
tion of animals in a given lot. In addi-
tion, the CVBA’s source verification
program includes agreements by
those receiving information on
feeder cattle to return information
on carcass quality. Information thus
flows in both directions.
AN EVOLVING SYSTEM
Vertical integration can be defined in
many ways, and it is not clear what
specific type of arrangement may be
necessary to further improve coordi-
nation. Whatever the type, however,
the feature that seems most impor-
tant in cattle markets is the estab-
lishment of a long-term (and
potentially exclusive) relationship
among the transacting parties.
While clearly beneficial in some
respects, long-term commitments
(that is, vertical integration) also
entail costs. In particular, the par-
ties to such an agreement limit
their use of markets, which offer
greater flexibility in procurement
and sourcing options, enhanced
price discovery, and arguably
higher-powered incentives for
cost-reducing efforts. “Firms” inevi-
tably involve elements of bureau-
cracy that can lead to higher
overall production costs. Activities
by organizations such as the CVBA
therefore can be viewed as at-
tempts to achieve the degree of co-
ordination and information
transmission observed in firms
without sacrificing the benefits as-
sociated with market institutions.
Time will tell whether such an out-
come can be achieved. 
John Lawrence is a livestock econo-
mist and director of the Iowa Beef
Center at Iowa State University. Brent
Hueth is an assistant professor of eco-
nomics at Iowa State. He specializes
in research on contract theory and
agricultural cooperatives.
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Iowa’s Agricultural Situation
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continued on page 10
Analysts watch for high prospective corn
plantings and possible record biotech acres
Alexander Saak
asaak@iastate.edu
515-294-0696
PLANTING INTENTIONS
The March 31 USDA Prospective Plantings report loweredthe national corn acreage and slightly raised the soybeanacreage relative to the market expectation. According to
the report, U.S. growers plan to sow 79 million acres of corn in
2003, which is unchanged from the previous year’s level and
close to the five-year average. Most states in the Great Plains
region reported a decrease in the intended corn plantings be-
cause of possible drought conditions and higher fertilizer and
energy prices. This decline is offset by increases in prospective
corn plantings by growers in the eastern Corn Belt who shifted
into soybeans last year because of the wet season. U.S. soybean
producers are projected to plant 73.2 million acres, down 1 per-
cent from 2002. The expected soybean acreage is the lowest in
the last five years and is slightly lower than the five-year aver-
age of 73.6 million acres. Counteracting the national trend, soy-
bean acreage is expected to increase in the northern Great
Plains as well as some areas in the south.
Traders were astounded by the higher-than-expected pro-
spective corn acreage reported. While market analysts cite input
costs, crop rotation patterns, and changes in loan rates as poten-
tial motives behind the planting intentions, they point out that
the final plantings likely will be influenced by future develop-
ments. According to the latest USDA Grain Stocks report, national
corn and soybean stocks were estimated at 5.13 and 1.2 billion
bushels as of March 1, down 11 and 10 percent respectively from
last year’s levels. Because of increases in corn fed to livestock
and used for ethanol, domestic use of corn was 4 percent higher
this winter than a year ago. Corn futures prices jumped after re-
lease of the positive news in the reports but subsequently lev-
eled off in view of disappointing corn exports. Soybean prices
remained high, in spite of the negative news contained in both
reports, mostly owing to strong export demand running well
ahead of USDA’s export projections and to continuing delays in
shipments of the large South American crop.
In Iowa, intended corn and soybean acreages for 2003 are
unchanged from last year’s levels at 12.3 and 10.4 million acres
respectively.
BIOTECH ACRES
According to the report, the prospective acres sown to crop va-
rieties developed using biotechnology attained a record share
of 38 percent, up 6 percentage points from 2002.
Nationwide, the split of biotechnology varieties present in
the 2002 corn crop was 22 percent to Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
insect-resistant corn, 9 percent to herbicide-resistant corn, and
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Iowa Cash Receipts  Jan. – Dec.
2002 2001 2000
                     (Million Dollars)
Crops 5,979 5,406 4,979
Livestock 5,179 5,936 5,912
Total 11,158 11,342 10,892
World Stocks-to-Use Ratios
     Crop Year
        2002/03       2001/02 2000/01
                  (March. Projection)        (Estimate)           (Actual)
             (Percent)
Corn 17.22 21.36 25.42
Soybeans 15.93 17.40 17.83
Wheat 29.03 34.55 34.93
Average Farm Prices
Received by Iowa Farmers
           March*             Feb.
            2003        2003     2002
                           ($/Bushel)
Corn 2.20 2.23 1.89
Soybeans 5.50 5.50 4.29
Oats 2.00 2.20 2.20
                            ($/Ton)
Alfalfa 81.00 81.00 89.00
All Hay 78.00 79.00 86.00
                            ($/Cwt.)
Steers & Heifers 73.00 74.50 69.00
Feeder Calves 89.30 89.00 100.00
Cows 37.50 38.00 41.60
Barrows & Gilts 35.60 35.20 36.70
Sows 27.10 26.20 33.10
Sheep 46.60 31.70
Lambs 87.20 65.00
              ($/Dozen)
Eggs 0.44 0.36 0.47
               ($/Cwt.)
All Milk 11.20 11.70 12.60
*Mid-month
     March
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Congress has once againpassed a disaster assistanceprogram for farmers. This
time the drought of 2001 and 2002
was the rationale for the legislation.
(For a review of the build-up to the
current disaster aid package, see
“Disaster Assistance: How Best to
Pay When Nature Has Her Way,” in
the Fall 2002 Iowa Ag Review, avail-
able at www.card.iastate.edu/
iowa_ag_review/fall_02/
article4.html.) In 1998, 1999, 2000,
and 2001, the rationale was low
market prices. The current disaster
assistance program pays crop farm-
ers if their harvested yield was less
than 65 percent of the average
yield. The cost of the crop assis-
tance package is estimated at about
$2.1 billion. While this might seem
relatively modest, it is important to
recognize that the crop insurance
program will pay out more than $4
billion in 2002, and it paid out al-
most $3 billion in 2001.
What is it about the crop insur-
ance program that makes it an inad-
equate assistance tool? After all,
Congress passed the Agricultural
Risk Protection Act (ARPA) in 2000
to better enable farmers to with-
stand financial downturns. Did ARPA
have its intended effects?
Crop insurance works by making
up the difference between harvested
yield (for traditional Multiple Peril
Crop Insurance) or harvested yield
times market price (for revenue in-
surance) and a farmer’s chosen in-
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



	
SPRING 2003        CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT   9
Iowa Ag Review
The combination of a federaldisaster program and priva-tized crop insurance is work-
able. The federal disaster program
would cover widescale agricultural
disasters. These disasters are what
prevent privatized crop insurance
from working today. A single agricul-
tural disaster would wipe out most
private companies. With a federal
disaster program in place, private
crop insurance would provide cov-
erage that would pay any losses that
exceed the federal payment. Farm-
surance guarantee. The maximum
guarantee available includes a 15 per-
cent deductible, and no insurance
payout is made until the loss covers
the deductible. Advocates of ARPA
felt that if farmers would reduce their
deductibles, then the additional in-
demnities that would flow in difficult
years would enable Congress to avoid
passing annual disaster assistance.
The easiest way to get somebody
to buy more of something is to lower
its price, and that is what Congress
did with crop insurance. Farmers
have discovered that the amount of
subsidy available to them on a per-
acre basis increases under ARPA
when they purchase a lower-deduct-
ible policy, so naturally, farmers
moved in that direction.
The top map shows that the av-
erage coverage level—which is sim-
ply 100 percent minus the
deductible—in every state before
ARPA (1998) was less than 65 per-
cent, which means that the average
deductible in every state was
greater than 35 percent. The bot-
tom map shows that ARPA in-
creased the average coverage level
in every state. Across all states,
the average coverage level in-
creased from less than 59 percent
to almost 67 percent. That is, ARPA
had its intended effect.
Farmers have amplified their
insurance coverage since 1998 by
about $9 billion, through increasing
both insured acreage and coverage
per acre. The taxpayer cost of this in-
creased coverage is about $1 billion
per year. Is this money well spent?
On the surface, we might con-
clude that the billion dollars per year
is wasted. After all, why spend a bil-
lion if Congress is still going to bail
farmers out with a disaster program?
But maybe a more telling question is,
How much would Congress have given
farmers if ARPA had not been in
place? Perhaps the additional cover-
age farmers purchased under ARPA
acted as a restraint on Congress’s pro-
pensity to give farmers assistance.
Conceivably crop farmers would have
received $5 billion rather than $2.1
billion. If so, then taxpayers came out
ahead by $1.9 billion because of ARPA!
Regardless of what kind of “spin”
is used to describe the role of ARPA
and disaster assistance programs,
we can only conclude that ARPA has
failed to wean farmers completely
from federal disaster assistance.
Perhaps it is time to throw in the
towel and do away with federally
subsidized crop insurance. Surely
there must be a less bureaucratic
way of providing financial assis-
tance to farmers when regional di-
sasters hit. After all, we have found
a way to pay farmers when national
prices fall. Why not find a way to
pay farmers when regional yields
fall? As shown in the accompanying
sidebar, a combination of a new fed-
eral countercyclical payment pro-
gram that covers widespread yield
disasters and individualized add-on
coverage that is privately provided
could offer a high level of risk pro-
tection without the problems of our
current system. 
An Alternative to the Current System
ers would decide if the federal pro-
tection was adequate for their needs
or whether the additional private
coverage was worth the cost, which
they would pay in full.
The current crop insurance pro-
gram costs roughly $3 billion per
year. A federal disaster program
could pay farmers when county rev-
enue falls below a certain percentage
of average county revenue for a crop
within a year. We estimate that the
cost of this program at a 95 percent
payment trigger level would average
$2.65 billion per year. The federal
program could be designed to
cover losses at the state or crop-
reporting district level, which
would lower costs, or it could pro-
vide coverage for yield losses. With
a stable federal program in place,
private insurers could determine
adequate insurance rates, and pro-
ducers would have plenty of op-
portunities to address their risk
management needs.
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2 percent to a stacked gene variety
having both insect and herbicide re-
sistance. Statewide, 41 percent of
the 2002 Iowa corn crop was geneti-
cally modified: 31 percent was Bt
corn, while 7 percent was herbicide
resistant and 3 percent was a
stacked gene variety. The 2003 inten-
tions survey shows nationwide that
corn producers intend to increase
their Bt corn plantings by 4 percent-
age points, while the shares of their
acres planted to herbicide-resistant
varieties remain unchanged, and
stacked gene varieties will increase
by only 1 percentage point. Iowa
growers intend to sow 47 percent of
their corn acreage to genetically
modified varieties. The share of in-
tended Bt corn increases to 38 per-
cent, the share of stacked gene corn
increases to 4 percent, and the share
of acreage planted to herbicide-resis-
tant corn falls to 5 percent.
Nationally, the intentions for
2003 show continued growth for her-
bicide-resistant soybeans, with 80
percent of the soybean crop allo-
cated to biotechnology varieties
compared with 75 percent last year.
Iowa soybean producers indicate
that 82 percent of the new crop will
be herbicide resistant compared to
75 percent in 2002.
LIVESTOCK
The March 28 USDA Hogs and Pigs
report indicated an expected de-
cline in hog numbers and the con-
tinuing liquidation of the breeding
herd. The inventory on U.S. farms is
lowered to 58.1 million head of
hogs, down almost 2 percent from
both a year ago and last quarter.
The breeding herd, at 5.96 million
head, is 4 percent below last year’s
level and 1 percent below the level
of the last report. The March inven-
tory of market hogs, at 52.2 million
head, is 2 percent below last year
and 3 percent below the December
inventory, which is indicative of
lower marketings this spring and
summer compared with last year.
Consistent spring and summer far-
rowing intentions reported by U.S.
hog producers are both 3 percent
below the actual farrowings at these
periods last year, suggesting that
marketings this fall and winter will
also fall considerably lower than
last year’s levels.
However, the report had little
positive impact on prices, as mar-
kets waited for further symptoms of
moderating hog slaughter in light of
the recent discrepancy between the
actual slaughter numbers and the
numbers calculated from the official
reports. Market observers specu-
late that the projected lower beef
and poultry production is likely to
help sustain the hog price rebound.
Pork stocks in cold storage con-
tinue to exceed last year’s levels
but are expected to decline in the
future. Having achieved significant
rates of growth in pork exports, the
pork industry is now more exposed
to volatile international markets,
as well as foreign meat safety regu-
lations, trade barriers, foreign
competition, and freight costs. Ac-
counting for changes in productiv-
ity, strong demand for bacon, and
new pork products, prices are ex-
pected to reach levels profitable
for producers this summer before
declining in the fall, according to
some estimates.
In Iowa, the inventory of mar-
ket hogs was estimated at 14.9 mil-
lion head, down 1.3 percent from
March 2002, a bit lower than the
nationwide level. However, the
state’s breeding herd showed a sig-
nificant drop of 7.1 percent, indicat-
ing a higher number of out-of-state
feeder pigs.
FARM INCOME
Statewide cash receipts, at $11.16
billion, fell slightly in 2002 com-
pared with last year’s receipts but
are nearly on a par with the five-
year average. While the revenues
in the crop sector rose 11 percent,
cash receipts for livestock fell 14
percent below last year’s income.
The increase in crop cash receipts
has been reflected in rising cash
rental rates for cropland. Iowa
cropland rates averaged $120 per
acre, up $3 from last year. Fiscal
year government payments for
Iowa fell from $2.302 billion in 2000
to $1.972 billion in 2001, mostly
because higher grain prices re-
duced payments under marketing
loan programs. 
Iowa’s Agricultural Situation
continued from page 6
limits? Opponents and proponents of
stricter payment limits will argue
endlessly about the fairness of large
payments to farmers. But this argu-
ment misses the point. Just because
large payments are made to indi-
vidual farmers does not mean that
the objectives of farm programs are
not being met. Congress has demon-
strated repeatedly that it wants to
subsidize a particular subset of U.S.
crops. And it is difficult to subsidize a
heterogeneous sector of the
economy without bestowing the larg-
est portion of subsidies on the largest
firms in the sector. Furthermore, it
could be argued that farm programs
exist precisely because they make
large payments to wealthy farmers.
That is, the potential for large subsi-
dies gives the largest farmers a rea-
son to lobby Congress to continue
farm programs.
So, what we are left with is a po-
litical decision about who gets what
portion of farm program benefits
and the purpose of the programs.
Given that current farm policy works
like an industrial policy for chosen
commodities, there is no economic
efficiency  rationale for payment lim-
its. Political and equity concerns will
decide the issue. 
Payment Limitations
continued from page 3
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Silvia Secchi
Meet the Staff: Silvia Secchi
Silvia Secchi came to CARD afterobtaining her first economicsdegree in Italy and a master’s
degree in agricultural economics at
the University of Reading in the
United Kingdom. She came to Iowa
State University to pursue her doc-
torate and became a graduate assis-
tant for CARD director Bruce
Babcock. When a position opened
up in the Resource and Environmen-
tal Policy (REP) Division of CARD, it
seemed a perfect fit for the newly
graduated Dr. Secchi. “I am really
interested in biology,” she says, “and
if I had not gone into economics, I
would have become a biologist. Envi-
ronmental economics is a great way
to combine the two disciplines.”
In the REP division, Silvia works
as part of a team of scientists and
specialists under the direction of di-
vision head Cathy Kling. She says
she has found the environment at
CARD to be supportive. “I think it’s
great that there are so many high-
quality researchers in the REP divi-
sion, she says, “and Cathy really de-
serves credit for this.
Silvia complements the econom-
ics modeling of her colleagues on
such issues as water quality related
to agriculture by making sure the
models are grounded in the realities
of the natural sciences, and by man-
aging spatial issues and Geographical
Information Systems analysis. Cur-
rently, the division is working on a
large-scale project to model the ef-
fects of agricultural practices on the
water quality of the Upper Missis-
sippi and Gulf of Mexico. “We are also
adapting these large-scale models to
smaller-scale watersheds to analyze
problems of water quality in several
watersheds in Iowa,” she says.
Another project, in collaboration
with Iowa State University professor
of economics Joe Herriges, attempts
to assess how residential property
values in rural Iowa are affected by
the residences’ proximity to live-
stock facilities. This kind of scientific
study is an example of how research
at CARD draws from other disci-
plines on campus in order to ad-
dress high-profile problems both
within and outside the state of Iowa.
Silvia says this multidisciplinary ap-
proach is important to her. “Environ-
mental and resource economists
really need to have some grasp of
the natural sciences or their model-
ing makes no sense,” she says, “so I
am glad there are so many people
here, both within CARD and across
campus, who know about the way
the natural world works. I really like
working with them.”
Silvia’s graduate work at CARD
included analysis of antibiotic resis-
tance issues, and she says the topic
continues to interest her. “As we
use antibiotics to improve our
health, we cause bacteria resistant
to antibiotics to develop,” she says,
“and so we reduce the efficacy of fu-
ture antibiotic treatment. The more
antibiotics we use today, the less ef-
fective they’ll be in the future.” Silvia
says that the problem has implica-
tions for research and development
in public health, for livestock pro-
duction (since antibiotics are used
on livestock, too), and for interna-
tional agreements (since bacteria
move across state and national
boundaries).
Silvia is originally from the Italian
island of Sardinia. She met her hus-
band, Steve, at Iowa State when they
were both students. The couple is ex-
pecting their first child, a girl, in June.
She says that “BB” (before baby), she
and her husband enjoyed traveling,
birdwatching, and shopping for an-
tiques. But her pregnancy may slow
her down a bit this spring. “These
days I am not very mobile, so outside
of work I enjoy cooking, playing with
my cats, or reading a novel.” 
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